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CONTROLLING PROPAGATION OF EPIDEMICS VIA MEAN-FIELD
GAMES
WONJUN LEE, SITING LIU, HAMIDOU TEMBINE, WUCHEN LI, AND STANLEY OSHER
Abstract. The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is changing and im-
pacting lives on a global scale. In this paper, we introduce a mean-field game model
in controlling the propagation of epidemics on a spatial domain. The control variable,
the spatial velocity, is first introduced for the classical disease models, such as the SIR
model. For this proposed model, we provide fast numerical algorithms based on proxi-
mal primal-dual methods. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the proposed model
illustrates how to separate infected patients in a spatial domain effectively.
1. Introduction
The outbreak of COVID-19 epidemic has resulted in over millions of confirmed cases
and hundred thousands of deaths globally. It has a huge impact on global economy as well
as everyone’s daily life. There has been a lot of interest in modeling the dynamics and
propagation of the epidemic. One of the well-known and basic models in epidemiology
is the SIR model proposed by Kermack and McKendrick [25] in 1927. Here, S, I, R
represent the number of susceptible, infected and recovered people respectively. They use
an ODE system to describe the transmission dynamics of infectious diseases among the
population. As the propagation of COVID-19 has significant spatial characteristic, actions
such as travel restrictions, physical distancing and self-quarantine are taken to slow down
the spread of the epidemic. It is important to have a spatial-type SIR model to study the
spread of the infectious disease and movement of individuals [24, 23, 17].
Since the epidemic has affected the society and individuals significantly, mean-field
games (MFG) provide a perspective to study and understand the underlying population
dynamics. Mean-field games were introduced by Jovanovic and Rosenthal [22], Huang,
Malhame´, and Caines [18], and Lasry and Lions [28, 29]. They model a huge population
of agents playing dynamic games. There is growing research interest in this direction.
For a review of MFG theory, we refer to [30, 14]. With wide application to various fields
[15, 6, 26, 1], computational methods are also designed to solve related high dimensional
MFG problems [3, 5, 12, 32, 36, 33].
In this paper, we combine the above ideas of spatial SIR model and MFG. In other
words, we introduce a mean-field game (control) model for controlling the virus spreading
within a spatial domain. Here the goal is to minimize the number of infectious agents
and the amount of movement of the population. In short, we formalize the following
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constrained optimization problem
inf
(ρi,vi)i∈{S,I,R}
E(ρI(T, ·)) +
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
∑
i∈{S,I,R}
αi
2
ρi‖vi‖2 + c
2
(ρS + ρI + ρR)
2dxdt
subject to 
∂tρS +∇ · (ρSvS) + βρSρI − η
2
S
2
∆ρS = 0
∂tρI +∇ · (ρIvR)− βρSρI + γρI − η
2
I
2
∆ρI = 0
∂tρR +∇ · (ρRvR)− γρI − η
2
R
2
∆ρR = 0
ρS(0, ·), ρI(0, ·), ρR(0, ·) are given.
Here ρi represents population density and vi describes the movement, with i ∈ {S, I,R}
corresponding to the susceptible, infected and recovered compartmental state or class.
We consider the spatial SIR model with nonlocal spreading modeled by an integration
kernel K representing the physical distancing and a spatial diffusion of population, and
set it as dynamic to our mean-field game problem, which is the constraint to the min-
imization problem. Due to the multiplicative nature of the interaction term between
susceptible and infectious agents βρSρI , the mean-field game problem is a non-convex
problem. With Lagrange multipliers, we formalize the mean-field game problem as an
unconstrained optimization problem. Fast numerical algorithms are designed to solve the
non-convex optimization problem in 2D with G− prox preconditioning [19].
In the literature, spatial SIR models in the form of a nonlinear integro-differential
[2, 11, 38] and reaction-diffusion system [23, 17] have been studied. Traveling waves are
studied to understand the propagation of various type of epidemics, such as Lyme disease,
measles etc, and recently, COVID-19 [7, 16, 39, 4]. In [4], they introduce a SIRT model
to study the effects of the presence of a road on the spatial propagation of the epidemic.
For surveys, see [34, 35]. As for numerical modelling of epidemic model concerning spatial
effect, finite-difference methods are used to discretize the reaction-diffusion system and
solve the spatial SIR model and its various extensions [10, 20, 13]. Epidemic models
have been treated using optimal control theory, with major control measures on medicare
(vaccination) [37, 27, 21]. In [21], a feedback control problem of SIR model is studied
to help determine the vaccine policy, with the goal to minimize the number of infected
people. In [31], they introduce a nonlinear SIQS epidemic model on complex networks
and study the optimal quarantine control. Compared to previous works, our model is the
first to consider an optimal control problem for SIR on a spatial domain. In particular,
we formulate velocity fields among S, I, R, populations as control variables.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the mean field control
model for propagation of epidemics. We introduce a primal-dual hybrid gradient algorithm
for this model in section 3. In section 4, several numerical examples are demonstrated.
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2. Model
In this section, we briefly review the classical epidemics models, e.g. SIR dynamics.
We then introduce a mean field control model for SIR dynamics on a spatial domain. We
derive a system to find the minimizer of the proposed model.
2.1. Review. We first review the classical SIR model.
dS
dt
= −βSI
dI
dt
= βSI − γI
dR
dt
= γI
where S, I,R : [0, T ] → [0, 1] represent the proportion of the susceptible population,
infected population, and recovered population, respectively, given time t. The nonnega-
tive constants β and γ represent the rates of susceptible becoming infected and infected
becoming recovered. SIR has an interpretation in terms of stochastic processes of agent-
based models. The SIR model can be obtained as a motion of the law of a three-state
Markov chain with the transition from S to I and I to R.
2.2. Spatial SIR variational problem. We then consider the spatial dimension of the
S, I, R functions. Let Ω ⊂ Rd be a bounded domain. Consider the following functions
ρS , ρI , ρR : [0, T ]× Ω→ R+, (i ∈ {S, I,R})
Here, ρS , ρI , and ρR represent susceptible, infected, and recovered populations, respec-
tively. We assume ρi for each i ∈ {S, I,R} moves on a spatial domain with velocities vi.
We can describe these movements by continuity equations.
∂tρS +∇ · (ρSvS) + βρSρI − η
2
S
2
∆ρS = 0
∂tρI +∇ · (ρIvI)− βρSρI + γρI − η
2
I
2
∆ρI = 0
∂tρR +∇ · (ρRvR)− γρI − η
2
R
2
∆ρR = 0
ρS(0, ·), ρI(0, ·), ρR(0, ·) are given.
(1)
where vi : [0, T ] × Ω → Rd (i ∈ {S, I,R}) are vector fields that represent the velocity
fields for ρi (i ∈ {S, I,R}) and nonnegative constants ηi (i ∈ {S, I,R}) are coefficients
representing for viscosity terms. In addition, we will assume zero flux conditions by the
Neumann boundary conditions. These systems of continuity equations satisfy the following
equality:
∂
∂t
∫
Ω
ρS(t, x) + ρI(t, x) + ρR(t, x)dx = 0,
i.e., the total mass of the populations will be conserved for all time.
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Lastly, we introduce the proposed mean field control models. Consider the following
variational problem:
inf
(ρi,vi)i∈{S,I,R}
E(ρI(T, ·)) +
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
∑
i∈{S,I,R}
αi
2
ρi‖vi‖2 + c
2
(ρS + ρI + ρR)
2dxdt
subject to (1) with fixed initial densities.
(2)
Here E is a convex functional and αi (i ∈ {S, I,R}) and c are nonnegative constants.
The minimizers of the above variational problem will provide the optimal movements for
each population while minimizing the terminal cost functional with respect to the infected
population ρI . The last term in the running cost,
c
2(ρS + ρI + ρR)
2, penalizes congestion
of the total population.
We note that the function (ρi, vi) 7→ ρi‖vi‖2 is not convex. By introducing new variables
mi := ρivi, we convert the cost function to be convex.
min
ρi,vi
P (ρi,mi)i∈{S,I,R} (3a)
subject to 
∂tρS +∇ ·mS + βρSρI − η
2
S
2
∆ρS = 0
∂tρI +∇ ·mI − βρSρI + γρI − η
2
I
2
∆ρI = 0
∂tρR +∇ ·mR − γρI − η
2
R
2
∆ρR = 0
ρS(0, ·), ρI(0, ·), ρR(0, ·) are given.
(3b)
Here
P (ρi,mi)i∈{S,I,R} =E(ρI(T, ·)) +
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
F (ρi,mi)i∈{S,I,R}dxdt
F (ρi,mi)i∈{S,I,R} =
αS‖mS‖2
2ρS
+
αI‖mI‖2
2ρI
+
αR‖mR‖2
2ρR
+
c
2
(ρS + ρI + ρR)
2.
From an optimization viewpoint, we note that the minimization problem is not a convex
problem since the coupling terms, βρSρI , in constraints make the feasible set nonconvex.
To regularize the nonconvex coupling term βρSρI , we replace products by convolutions.
min
(ρi,vi)i∈{S,I,R}
P (ρi,mi)i∈{S,I,R} (4a)
subject to
∂tρS(t, x) +∇ ·mS(t, x) + βρS(t, x)
∫
Ω
K(x, y)ρI(t, y)dy − η
2
S
2
∆ρS(t, x) = 0
∂tρI(t, x) +∇ ·mI(t, x)− βρI(x)
∫
Ω
K(x, y)ρS(t, y)dy + γρI(t, x)− η
2
I
2
∆ρI(t, x) = 0
∂tρR(t, x) +∇ ·mR(t, x)− γρI(t, x)− η
2
R
2
∆ρR(t, x) = 0
ρS(0, ·), ρI(0, ·), ρR(0, ·) given.
(4b)
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Here K(x, y) is a symmetric positive definite kernel representing the physical distancing
between a susceptible agent located at position x and infectious agent at position y, and∫
ΩK(x, y)ρI(t, y)dy is the exposure of a susceptible located at x to infectious agents. In
this paper, we focus on a Gaussian kernel
K(x, y) =
1√
(2pi)d
d∏
k=1
1
σk
exp
(
−|xk − yk|
2
2σ2k
)
.
In modeling, the variance σ of Gaussian kernel can be viewed as a parameter for modeling
the spatial spreading effect of virus.
Remark 1. The formulation is not limited to the SIR model we chose in this paper. It can
be used to solve any types of spatial epidemiological models.
2.3. Properties. We next derive the mean field game system, i.e. the minimizer system
associated with spatial SIR variational problem (4).
Define the Lagrangian functional
L((ρi,mi, φi)i∈{S,I,R})
=P (ρi,mi)i∈{S,I,R} −
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
∑
i∈{S,I,R}
φi
(
∂tρi +∇ ·mi − η
2
i
2
∆ρi
)
dxdt
+
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
βφIρIK ∗ ρS − βφSρSK ∗ ρI + γρI(φR − φI)dxdt.
(5)
Using this Lagrangian functional, we convert the minimization problem into a saddle
problem.
inf
(ρi,mi)i∈{S,I,R}
sup
(φi)i∈{S,I,R}
L((ρi,mi, φi)i∈{S,I,R}). (6)
Because of the nonconvex functional (ρS , ρI) 7→ ρSρI , the feasible set here is nonconvex.
Thus, we cannot guarantee that the dual gap is zero for this problem. Swapping infimum
and supremum will only provide us a lower bound for the minimization problem. Here we
hope that we can gain good information from the bound.
inf
(ρi,mi)i∈{S,I,R}
sup
(φi)i∈{S,I,R}
L((ρi,mi, φi)i∈{S,I,R}) ≥ sup
φi
inf
(ρi,mi)i∈{S,I,R}
L((ρi,mi, φi)i∈{S,I,R}).
The following propositions are the properties of the saddle point problem derived from
optimality conditions (KarushKuhnTucker (KKT) conditions).
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Proposition 1 (Mean field game SIR system). By KKT conditions, the saddle problem
(6) satisfies the following equations.
∂tφS − αS
2
|∇φS |2 + η
2
S
2
∆φS + c(ρS + ρI + ρR) + β (K ∗ (φIρI)− φSK ∗ ρI) = 0
∂tφI − αI
2
|∇φI |2 + η
2
I
2
∆φI + c(ρS + ρI + ρR)
+ β (φIK ∗ ρS −K ∗ (φSρS)) + γρ(φR − φI) = 0
∂tφR − αR
2
|∇φR|2 + η
2
R
2
∆φR + c(ρS + ρI + ρR) = 0
∂tρS − 1
αS
∇ · (ρS∇φS) + βρSK ∗ ρI − η
2
S
2
∆ρS = 0
∂tρI − 1
αI
∇ · (ρ∇φI)− βρIK ∗ ρS + γρI − η
2
I
2
∆ρI = 0
∂tρR − 1
αR
∇ · (ρ∇φR)− γρI − η
2
R
2
∆ρR = 0.
(7)
where ρS(0, ·), ρI(0, ·), ρR(0, ·) are given and
φI(T, x) = δE(ρI(T, x)).
Proof. By integration by parts, we reformulate the Lagrangian function (6) as follows.
L((ρi,mi, φi)i∈{S,I,R})
=E(ρI(T, ·)) +
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
βφIρIK ∗ ρS − βφSρSK ∗ ρI + γρI(φR − φI)dxdt
+
∑
i∈{S,I,R}
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
αi‖mi‖2
2ρi
+ ρi∂tφi +mi · ∇φi + η
2
i
2
ρi∆φi +
c
2
(ρS + ρI + ρR)
2dxdt
+
∑
i∈{S,I,R}
∫
Ω
ρi(0, x)φi(0, x)− ρi(T, x)φi(T, x)dx
Let the differential of Lagrangian with respect to ρi, mi, φi (i ∈ {S, I,R}), ρI(T, ·), equal
to zero. We have 
δ
δρi
L = 0
δ
δmi
L = 0
δ
δφi
L = 0.
Hence −∇φi = αi miρi . And we derive the result. 
We note that dynamical system (7) models the optimal vector field strategies for S,I,R
populations. It combines both strategies from mean field games and SIR models. For this
reason, we call (7) Mean field game SIR system.
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3. Algorithm
In this section, we implement optimization methods to solve the proposed SIR vari-
ational problems. Specifically, we use G-Prox Primal Dual Hybrid Gradient (G-Prox
PDHG) method [19]. This is a variation of Chambolle-Pock primal-dual algorithm [8, 9].
3.1. Review of primal-dual algorithms. The PDHG method solves the minimization
problem
min
x
f(Ax) + g(x)
by converting it into a saddle point problem
min
x
sup
y
{L(x, y) := 〈Ax, y〉+ g(x)− f∗(y)} .
Here, f and g are convex functions with respect to a variable x, A is a continuous linear
operator, and
f∗(y) = sup
x
x · y − f(x)
is a Legendre transform of f . For each iteration, the algorithm finds the minimizer x∗
by gradient descent method and the maximizer y∗ by gradient ascent method. Thus, the
minimizer and maximizer are calculated by iterating{
xk+1 = arg minx L(x, y
k) + 12τ ‖x− xk‖2
yk+1 = arg maxy L(x
k+1, y) + 12σ‖y − yk‖2
where τ and σ are step sizes for the algorithm.
Here G-Prox PDHG is a modified version of PDHG that solves the minimization problem
by choosing the most appropriate norms for updating x and y. Choosing the appropriate
norms allows us to choose larger step sizes. Hence, we get a faster convergence rate. In
details, {
xk+1 = arg minx L(x, y
k) + 12τ ‖x− xk‖2H
yk+1 = arg maxy L(x
k+1, y) + 12σ‖y − yk‖2G
where H and G are some Hilbert spaces with the inner product
(u1, u2)G = (Au1, Au2)H.
In particular, we use G-Prox PDHG to solve the minimization problem (4) by setting
x = (ρS , ρI , ρR,mS ,mI ,mR), g(x) = F (ρi,mi)i∈{S,I,R}, f(Ax) =
{
0 if Ax = (0, 0, γρI)
∞ otherwise.
Ax = (∂tρS +∇ ·mS − η
2
2
∆ρS + βρSK ∗ ρI ,
∂tρI +∇ ·mI − η
2
2
∆ρI − βρIK ∗ ρS + γρI ,
∂tρR +∇ ·mR − η
2
2
∆ρR).
8 LEE, LIU, TEMBINE, LI, AND OSHER
Note that the operator A is not linear. In the implementation, we approximate the oper-
ator with the following linear operator
Ax ≈ (∂tρS +∇ ·mS − η
2
2
∆ρS + βρS ,
∂tρI +∇ ·mI − η
2
2
∆ρI + (γ − β)ρI ,
∂tρR +∇ ·mR − η
2
2
∆ρR).
3.2. G-Prox PDHG on SIR variational problem. In this section, we implement G-
Prox PDHG to solve the saddle problem (6). For i ∈ {S, I,R},
ρ
(k+1)
i = arg minρ
L(ρ,m(k)i , φ(k)i ) +
1
2τi
‖ρ− ρ(k)i ‖2L2
m
(k+1)
i = arg minm
L(ρ(k+1),m, φ(k)i ) +
1
2τi
‖m−m(k)i ‖2L2
φ
(k+ 1
2
)
i = arg max
φ
L(ρ(k+1),m(k+1)i , φ)−
1
2σi
‖φ− φ(k)i ‖2H2
φ
(k+1)
i = 2φ
(k+ 1
2
)
i − φ(k)i
where τi, σi (i ∈ {S, I,R}) are step sizes for the algorithm and by G-Prox PDHG, L2
norm and H2 norm are defined as
‖u‖L2 =
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
u(t, x)2dxdt
‖u‖H2 =
∫ T
0
∫
Ω
(∂tu)
2 + ‖∇u‖2 + η
4
4
(∆u)2dxdt
for any u : [0, T ]× Ω→ [0, 1].
By formulating these optimality conditions, we can find explicit formulas for each vari-
able.
ρ
(k+1)
S = root+
(
τS
1 + cτS
(
∂tφ
(k)
S +
η2S
2
∆φ
(k)
S −
1
τS
ρ
(k)
S + β
(
K ∗ (φ(k)I ρ(k)I )− φ(k)S K ∗ ρ(k)I
)
+ c(ρI + ρR)
)
, 0,−τSαS(m
(k)
S )
2
2(1 + cτS)
)
ρ
(k+1)
I = root+
(
τI
1 + cτI
(
∂tφ
(k)
I +
η2I
2
∆φ
(k)
I −
1
τI
ρ
(k)
I + β
(
φ
(k)
I K ∗ ρ(k)S −K ∗ (φ(k)S ρ(k)S )
)
+ γ(φR − φI) + c(ρS + ρR)
)
, 0,−τIαI(m
(k)
I )
2
2(1 + cτI)
)
ρ
(k+1)
R = root+
(
τR
1 + cτR
(
∂tφ
(k)
R +
η2R
2
∆φ
(k)
R −
1
τR
ρ
(k)
R + c(ρS + ρI)
)
, 0,−τRαR(m
(k)
R )
2
2(1 + cτR)
)
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m
(k+1)
i =
ρ
(k+1)
i
ταi + ρ
(k+1)
i
(
m
(k)
i − τ∇φ(k)i
)
, (i ∈ {S, I,R})
φ
(k+1)
S = φ
(k)
S + σS(A
T
SAS)
−1
(
−∂tρ(k+1)S −∇ ·m(k+1)S − βρ(k+1)S K ∗ ρ(k+1)I +
η2S
2
∆ρ
(k+1)
S
)
φ
(k+ 1
2
)
I = φ
(k)
I + σI(A
T
I AI)
−1
(
−∂tρ(k+1)I −∇ ·m(k+1)I + βρ(k+1)I K ∗ ρ(k+1)S
− γρ(k+1)I +
η2I
2
∆ρ
(k+1)
I
)
φ
(k+ 1
2
)
R = φ
(k)
R + σR(A
T
RAR)
−1
(
−∂tρ(k+1)R −∇ ·m(k+1)R + γρ(k+1)I +
η2R
2
∆ρ
(k+1)
R
)
where root+(a, b, c) is a positive root of a cubic polynomial x
3 + ax2 + bx+ c = 0 and
ATSAS = −∂tt +
η4S
4
∆2 − (1 + 2βηS)∆ + β2
ATI AI = −∂tt +
η4I
4
∆2 − (1 + 2(γ − β)ηS)∆ + (γ − β)2
ATRAR = −∂tt +
η4R
4
∆2 −∆.
We use FFTW library to compute (ATi Ai)
−1 (i ∈ {S, I,R}) by Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT). Computing these inverse operators is O(n log n) operations per iteration where
n is the number of points. The bottleneck of the algorithm comes from calculating the
convolution. Note that the operation can be easily parallelized since the convolution on
one point does not affect the convolutions on the other points.
In all, we summarize the algorithm as follows.
Algorithm: G proximal PDHG for mean field game SIR system
Input: ρi(0, ·) (i ∈ {S, I,R})
Output: ρi,mi, φi (i ∈ {S, I,R}) for x ∈ Ω, t ∈ [0, T ]
While relative error > tolerance
ρ
(k+1)
i = arg minρ L(ρ,m(k)i , φ(k)i ) + 12τi ‖ρ− ρ
(k)
i ‖2L2
m
(k+1)
i = arg minm L(ρ(k+1),m, φ(k)i ) + 12τi ‖m−m
(k)
i ‖2L2
φ
(k+ 1
2
)
i = arg maxφ L(ρ(k+1),m(k+1)i , φ)− 12σi ‖φ− φ
(k)
i ‖2H2
φ
(k+1)
i = 2φ
(k+ 1
2
)
i − φ(k)i
end
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Here, the relative error is defined as
relative error =
|P (ρ(k+1)i ,m(k+1)i )− P (ρ(k)i ,m(k)i )|
|P (ρ(k)i ,m(k)i )|
.
4. Experiments
In this section, we present two sets of numerical experiments using the algorithm with
various parameters and all algorithms are coded in C++. Let Ω = [0, 1]2 be a unit cube
in R2 and T = 1. The domain Ω is discretized with the regular rectangular mesh
xkl =
(
k + 0.5
Nx
,
l + 0.5
Ny
)
, k = 0, · · · , Nx − 1, l = 0, · · · , Ny − 1
tn =
n
Nt − 1 , n = 0, · · · , Nt − 1.
where Nx, Ny are the number of data points in space and Nt is the number of data points
in time. For all the experiments, we use the same set of parameters,
Nx = 128, Ny = 128, Nt = 32
σ = 0.01, c = 0.01 β = 0.7, ηi = 0.01 (i ∈ {S, I,R})
αS = 1, αI = 10, αR = 1
and a terminal cost functional
E(ρI(1, ·)) = 1
2
∫
Ω
ρ2I(1, x)dx.
By setting higher value for αI , we penalize the movement of infected population more than
other populations. Considering the immobility of infected individuals, this is a reasonable
choice in terms of real-world applications.
To minimize the terminal cost functional E(ρI), a solution needs to minimize the num-
ber of infected population. There are mainly two ways of reducing the number of infected.
First way is to transition infected to recovered population. However, it may not be fea-
sible if a rate of recovery γ is small. Another way to reduce the number of infected is
by separating susceptible population from infected population. The number of infected
doesn’t increase if there are no susceptible people near infected. However, the total cost
increases when densities move due to ρi‖vi‖2 (i ∈ {S, I,R}) terms in the running cost. A
solution needs to find the optimal balance between the terminal cost and the running cost.
The following two sets of experiments show that the algorithm finds the proper solutions
based on values of γ given different initial densities.
4.1. Experiment 1. In this experiment, initial densities for susceptible, infected, and
recovered populations are
ρS(0, x) = 0.5 exp
(
−10((x1 − 0.5)2 + (x2 − 0.5)2))
ρI(0, x) = 15
(
0.03− (x1 − 0.6)2 − (x2 − 0.6)2
)
+
ρR(0, x) = 0
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where
(x)+ =
{
x if x > 0
0 otherwise.
Susceptible population is a Gaussian distribution centered at (0.5, 0.5) and infected pop-
ulation is concentrated at (0.6, 0.6).
We show two different numerical results with a low rate of recovery γ = 0.1 (Figure 1)
and a high rate of recovery γ = 0.5 (Figure 2). In both figures, the evolution of densties ρi
(i ∈ {S, I,R}) are shown at t = 0, 0.21, 0.47, 0.74, 1. The total population of each density
is indicated as sum in the subtitle of each plot.
When γ is small (Figure 1), the solution separates susceptible population from infected
population. By separating susceptible from infected, the solution minimizes the terminal
cost at t = 1. When γ is large (Figure 2), susceptible population barely moves over time.
The solution minimizes the terminal cost by converting infected to recovered population
which is considered to be cheaper than moving susceptible away from infected.
Figure 1. Experiment 1. The evolution of populations from t = 0 to
t = 1 with β = 0.7 and γ = 0.1. The first row represents susceptible, the
second row represents infected, and the last row represents recovered. The
solution moves susceptible away from the infected over time.
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Figure 2. Experiment 1. The evolution of populations from t = 0 to
t = 1 with β = 0.7 and γ = 0.5. The first row represents susceptible,
the second row represents infected, and the last row represents recovered.
The solution minimizes the number of infected at time t = 1 by recovering
infected population.
4.2. Experiment 2. In this experiment, initial densities for susceptible, infected, and
recovered populations are
ρS(0, x) = 0.5
ρI(0, x) = 70
(
0.005− (√(x− 0.5)2 + (y − 0.5)2 − 0.25)2)
+
ρR(0, x) = 0.
Susceptible population is a uniform distribution on Ω and infected population is a ring
shaped density centered at (0.5, 0.5). We again show that two different numerical results
with a low rate of recovery γ = 0.1 (Figure 3) and a high rate of recovery γ = 0.5
(Figure 4). Similar to Experiment 1, we see that the solution minimizes the number
of infection by moving susceptible away from infected when γ is small. By separating
these two populations, it minimizes the rate of contacts between susceptible and infected.
When γ is large, the solution converts infected to recovered population rather than moving
susceptible population.
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Figure 3. Experiment 2. The evolution of populations from t = 0 to t = 1
with β = 0.7 and γ = 0.1. The first row represents susceptible, the second
row represents infected, and the last row represents recovered.
4.3. Experiment 3. In this experiment, we consider nonsymmetric initial densities.
ρS(0, x) = 0.45
(
exp
(−15((x− 0.3)2 + (y − 0.3)2))
+ exp
(−25((x− 0.5)2 + (y − 0.75)2))
+ exp
(−30((x− 0.8)2 + (y − 0.35)2)))
ρI(0, x) = 10
(
0.04− (x− 0.2)2 − (y − 0.65)2)
+
+ 12
(
0.03− (x− 0.5)2 − (y − 0.2)2)
+
+ 12
(
0.03− (x− 0.8)2 − (y − 0.55)2)
+
ρR(0, x) = 0.
Susceptible population is the sum of three Gaussian distributions and infected population
is the sum of positive part of quadratic polynomials. We conduct this experiment to
show that the algorithm works for nonsymmetric initial densities. Using the same set
of parameters, the experiment is repeated twice with γ = 0.1 and γ = 0.5. The same
behavior of solutions can be observed from Figure 5 and Figure 6.
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Figure 4. Experiment 2. The evolution of populations from t = 0 to t = 1
with β = 0.7 and γ = 0.5. The first row represents susceptible, the second
row represents infected, and the last row represents recovered.
5. Discussion
In this paper, we introduce a mean-field game model for controlling the virus spreading
of a population in a spatial domain, which extends and controls the current SIR model
with spatial effect. Here the state variable represents the population status, such as S,
I, R, etc with a spatial domain, while the control variable is the velocity of motion of
the population. The terminal cost forms the goal of government, which balances the
total infection number and maintain suitable physical movement of essential tasks and
goods. Numerical algorithms are derived to solve the proposed model. Several experiments
demonstrate that our model can effectively demonstrate how to separate the infected and
susceptible population in a spatial domain.
Our model opens the door to many questions in modeling, inverse problems and com-
putations, especially during this COVID-19 pandemic. On the modeling side, first, we are
interested in generalize the geometry of the spatial domain. Second, our current model
only focuses on the control of population movement. The control of the diffusion operator
among populations is also of great interests in future work. Third, the government can also
put restrictions on the interaction for different class of populations, depending on their
infection status. Fourth, in real life, the spatial domain is often inhomogeneous, containing
airports, schools, subways etc. We also need to formulate our mean-field game model on a
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Figure 5. Experiment 3. The evolution of populations from t = 0 to t = 1
with β = 0.7 and γ = 0.1. The first row represents susceptible, the second
row represents infected, and the last row represents recovered.
discrete spatial graph (network). In addition, our model focus on the forward problem of
modeling the dynamics of the virus. In practice, real time data is generated as the virus
spreading across different regions. To effectively model this dynamic, a suitable inverse
mean-field game problem needs to be constructed. On the computational side, our model
involves a non-convex optimization problem, which comes from the multiplicative term of
the SIR model itself. In future work, we expect to design a fast and reliable algorithm for
these advanced models. We also expect to develop and apply AI numerical algorithms to
compute models in high dimensions.
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